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Canada’s Great War on Film
Lest We Forget (1935)
Tim Cook
Lest We Forget will “stand out in the history of filmdom.” Ottawa Evening Journal1
“Dress Up to See the Slaughter.” Ottawa Citizen2
Lest We Forget “comes at a very opportune time, with the threat of a new holocaust
fanning the flame of patriotic spirits to consider the price that war demands from
civilization.” London Evening Free Press3

L

est We Forget was Canada’s official Great War
film. It sparked controversy when it was
shown across the country in
1935, during the midst of the
worst depression in Canadian
history, and with a growing anxiety
over the increased aggression of
international dictators. The film
provided a contested venue for
what the Great War had meant to a
generation of Canadians. But this
was no ordinary war film. Officially
sanctioned and constructed from
archival wartime footage, the story
of Canada’s war was told in 100
minutes, from the opening phases
through to the grim fighting on
the Western Front, and including
those who supported the soldiers
from home. Many journalists,
politicians, and veterans called Lest
We Forget the most authentic film
to have appeared since the end of
the war, especially in contrast to
Hollywood fictional productions.
This article examines the
conflicting discourse surrounding
Lest We Forget. While the official
film, what we would now call a
documentary, provided important
insight into the war, and how it
would be remembered, it probably tells us more

about the 1930s than the period from 1914
to 1918. But this is only one part of the story.
Canada’s Great War film history
remains largely unexplored. 4
Where did this film footage come
from? Who filmed Canadians on
the battlefield? How did these
cameramen work within the deadly
environment of shrapnel, snipers,
and poison gas? How was the film
footage received during and after
the war? To better understand
the importance of Lest We Forget,
it is not just the film and the
public’s reaction to it that must
be analysed, but also the footage
that was used to underpin the
narrative.
*****

W

hen Britain was at war,
Canada was at war.
The heady days of August 1914
were marked with celebration
and excitement as Canadians
clamoured to serve King and
country. More than 30,000 enlisted
in the First Contingent and were
headed overseas by October;
they were to be joined by almost
400,000 more in the coming
years. Most would fight in the Canadian Corps.
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The Canadians suffered through the trial-by-fire
battles of Ypres, St. Eloi, Mount Sorrel and the
Somme in the first two years of the war. From
1917 onward, however, the Corps won a string
of victories at Vimy, Hill 70, Passchendaele,
and during the Hundred Days campaign. The
Canadians were forced to adapt as they passed
through the meat grinder of the Western Front.
Along with this costly road to professionalism,
there was an emerging sense of distinctiveness,
especially in relation to British forces. But this
did not happen by chance. The Canadian Corps
had an active publicity campaign throughout
the war.

Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 22966

The organization behind this promotion was
the Canadian War Records Office (CWRO), headed
by Sir Max Aitken, later Lord Beaverbrook, an
expatriate Canadian millionaire with close ties
to military and political leaders in both Canada
and Britain. With characteristic passion, Aitken
employed his considerable skills as a press baron,
Member of Parliament, and influential peer to

nurture a campaign of extolling the heroic deeds
of Canadians. Journalistic features accentuating
Canadian exploits, the commissioning of artists
and photographers to craft Canadian-content
works, the creation of commemorative journals,
and even the publication of the first popular
war histories all helped to shape a distinctive
Canadian identity. Largely at his own discretion,
but also supported by Prime Minister Robert
Borden and Minister of Militia and Defence Sam
Hughes, Aitken’s plan, when combined with the
very real accomplishments of the Corps on the
battlefield, enshrined the Canadians’ reputation
as elite troops and as a distinctive group within
the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Aitken
used film to support his dual mandate of
publicizing his countrymen, while at the same
time gathering and preserving war records that
would be employed by future generations of
historians to interpret the Great War’s legacy.
Film was not a new medium. It had attracted
growing audiences since the turn of the century,
as it brought stories and images to the
public, transporting the viewer through
time and space. Undercutting live theatre
and music halls, “going to the pictures” was
a weekly ritual for thousands in Canada,
and millions around the world: indeed,
by the summer of 1916, more than twenty
million tickets were being sold each week
in England alone.5 With pictures embraced
by all levels of society, film was seen as a
unique tool for reaching the masses. The
importance of the cinema was not lost on
the CWRO’s senior officers, who noted in
one memorandum regarding propaganda
that film “might indeed almost have been
invented for the purpose.”6
As Canadians enlisted by the thousands
in the first two years of the war, throngs
of their community members came out
to see them as they marched, drilled, or
entrained for their camps, and then went
overseas. Film producers were obviously
interested in the pageantry and spectacle
of the events. When the exuberant and
vain Sam Hughes visited Victoria, British
Columbia to inspect troops in January
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Sir Max Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook) with
an unidentified woman, 1916. Beaverbrook
was dedicated to promoting the Canadians, but
remained an important player in the political and
social scene in London, England.
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1915, he encountered D.J. Dwyer, an American
cinematographer, who had been hired to film the
30th Battalion. The minister was impressed by
some of the films – especially those that captured
him strutting around and barking orders. Yet
not all were pleased with the idea of posing for
the cameras, and Captain Harry Crerar, a future
army commander, recounted bitterly a similar
review in a downpour of rain “for Sam Hughes’
benefit and for moving picture operators. A damn
nuisance and a waste of time.”7
Hughes thought otherwise and gave Dwyer an
honorary title of lieutenant. At his own expense,
the cinematographer was ordered to England to
film the Canadians then training on Salisbury
Plain, with the understanding that all of his film
would later be transferred to the Public Archives
as a permanent record.8 The notoriously reserved
British War Office allowed Dwyer, as Hughes’s
representative, to document the Canadians, but
he also free-lanced throughout other training
camps.9 Canada’s Fighting Forces (1915), his
film of the Canadian Division and its inspection
by the King and Lord Kitchener before it was
sent to France, was shown throughout the
Empire. It was a commercial success. But aside
from the appeal of seeing the King and other
dignitaries, who were popular at all times, there
was little military footage other than ubiquitous
training shots, aircraft flying, and a glimpse of
hospitalized soldiers.
In Britain, at the time, film production
remained with private newsreel companies, but
they were restricted in what they could cover, and
always censored heavily. For greater influence,
they organized themselves into the British Topical
Committee for War Films in October 1915, and
succeeded in negotiating an agreement with the
restrictive War Office to have access to the front
lines. But it was an unhappy relationship, and
the War Office was never comfortable in giving
up control of information. In early 1916, it
established the War Office Cinema Committee
to coordinate all films within the British
Expeditionary Force (BEF).10 Sir Max Aitken
would eventually be appointed to chair this
committee, but before that he was attempting to
carve out a reputation for the Canadians.
Aitken had been appointed as Eye Witness
for the Canadian forces in January 1915, duly
reporting back to Ottawa on military and political

matters.11 But Aitken had proven throughout his
36 years that he could always exploit a situation
to his advantage, in business or his personal life,
and so he expanded his power in the confusing
structure of the overseas Canadian forces where
there were, at one time, six generals in various
competing commands.12 Along with his political
machinations in Britain’s Tory party, Aitken’s
goal as Eye Witness, and later Records Officer
(to which he was appointed in early 1916),
was simple: “to follow the fortunes of the First
Division in France, to share its experiences, and
to give the public of Canada an account of the
performances of its regiments, and finally to
enshrine in a contemporary history those exploits
which will make the First Division immortal.”13
He had done this first by writing laudatory
newspaper accounts that were published in
Canada and throughout the Empire, and then
authoring Canada in Flanders (1916), a bestselling history that highlighted the heroics of the
Canadian Division during the bloody and costly
Battle of Second Ypres in April 1915. Aitken
had indeed begun to fulfill his mandate of both
documenting and popularizing the Canadian war
effort.14
Aitken also influenced the creation of war
records in order to lay down the “bedrock of
history.”15 With his Canadian War Records Office,
an organization that he established in January
1916 and initially paid for out of his own pocket,
he employed wounded soldiers or over-aged
men to document the Canadian Expeditionary
Force (CEF).16 Historical officers were sent into
the field to gather documents and influence
soldiers to create better records; this they did,
and after the 1916 Somme battles, the CWRO’s
intervention improved the quality and scope of
the War Diaries.17 But Aitken was also anxious
to present the war to Canadians at home, those
who worried and waited for loved ones.
To do this, however, Canadians needed more
than evocative newspaper accounts or vivid
histories. Aitken pushed for greater coverage of
the war effort through war art, photography, and
film in the summer of 1916. The War Office fought
him tooth and nail. But Aitken was a powerful
figure and had unique rights as Canada’s Eye
Witness. He refused to back down, enlisting
allies in England and Canada; yet, as he noted
wryly later in the war, while still trying to profile
7
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Canadian actions, “the spirit was willing but the
censorship was by no means weak.”18 With his
considerable influence, he manoeuvred around
the War Office’s objections and soon had war
artists, photographers, and cinematographers
working to document the Canadians on the
Western Front.
Having missed capturing the first year and
a half of the war on film, Aitken instructed
the CWRO to purchase existing footage from
local companies and gather Dwyer’s films. But
Dwyer had plans to follow up on the success of
his earlier film. After bitter accusations, Dwyer
escaped to Canada with his films, but Aitken,
furious that the cinematographer was profiting
from the service of other Canadians, used his
influence to ban Dwyer from returning to England
in an official capacity.19 Without this material,
though, the CWRO had only limited footage of
Canadians training in England. It was essential
to get cameramen to the front to fulfil Aitken’s
twin mandates of publicizing and documenting
his countrymen in battle.
By the summer of 1916, Lieutenant F.O.
Bovill, a British artillery driver with some film
experience, was embedded in the CEF. He filmed
the Somme battles later that year. The footage was
a stunning success, with Bovill capturing blasted
landscapes, marching soldiers, lumbering tanks,
and artillery fire. It was later edited to produce
a commercially successful film, Canadian
Victory at Courcelette (1917). “The value of the
exhibition of these films in Canada can hardly be
over-stated, while their presentation in neutral
countries throughout the world will enormously
enhance the knowledge and renown of Canada,”
Aitken crowed to Borden.20
The films indeed brought attention to the
Canadian war effort, and the Duputy Minister
of Militia and Defence, Eugene Fiset, believed
they were important tools to support morale
and “serve as an effective antidote to the poison
of German war pictures” then circulating in
neutral United States.21 But not all agreed that
unfettered knowledge of overseas action was
useful. The strict censorship rules emanating
from the government’s chief press censor, Ernest
Chambers, meant that some of the harsher
images in the films were not presented to the
Canadian public for fear of affecting enlistment.22
Chambers hoped to reduce the shock of war even
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though wounded veterans and uncensored letters
were still finding there way back to Canada.23
There were also a number of films produced
domestically that extolled citizens to ration
their food or support the war effort through the
patriotic purchase of war bonds.24 Despite the
censors’ efforts, the war was coming home to
Canada.
The CWRO film footage also drew widespread attention in England. Critics complained
that Aitken’s media blitz of publications,
photographs, war art, and film made it appear
that only the Canadians were fighting on the
Western Front.25 The film footage was especially
prevalent, and CWRO reports noted sheepishly
that “there are a disgruntled few who think the
Canadians’ cameras and films have been too
busy.” It was, to some, a “crusade by camera.”26
When Aitken created his own separate
Canadian cinematography committee in July
1916, the War Office was quick to notice the
Dominion competition with their already
established network. Shortly thereafter, a joint
British-Canadian Cinematograph Committee
was formed with Sir Max as its chairman. The
committee produced the War Office Official
Topical Budget, two eight-minute films each
week that were passed by military censors and
then distributed throughout the Empire, usually
shown before or in between longer theatre
shows. Aitken appointed the Honourable J.W.
Smith, former Managing Director of Barker
Motion Photographing Company, to ensure that
“Canadian interests were safeguarded.”27 On
direct orders from Aitken, Canadian footage was
included in every weekly picture, something no
other Dominion could claim.
It was thus the role of the field cinematographers
to supply the Committee with suitable Canadian
images. Unfortunately, after Bovill’s excellent
first shots of the Somme battles, he was unable
to replicate his success. The Canadian Corps
processed the hard-won lessons of the Somme
over the winter of 1916-17 in elaborate training
programs, but also engaged in an active policy
Opposite: Canadian official photographer on the Western
Front, September 1916. Note the difficulty of filming
on the open battlefield with no cover. Cameramen and
cinematographers were often forced to trade distance
for safety.
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of trench raiding. These stealth operations were
almost always carried out at night, and were
nearly impossible to capture on film. Bovill shot
new footage in early 1917, and claimed to have
succeeded in filming some raids, but was later
forced to admit the film did not turn out due to
poor lighting.28
Bovill’s failure was exacerbated by his
inability to secure good footage at Vimy Ridge.
During this coming-of-age battle in April 1917,
where the four Canadian divisions fought together
for the first time and drove the Germans from
their formidable position on the ridge, Bovill’s
weak footage indicated damningly that he had
stayed in the rear areas. With only footage of
troops moving forward and artillery batteries in
action, it was clear that Bovill had not advanced
with the infantry. The limitations of the fragile
hand-cranked cameras no doubt hurt his ability
to keep up with spearhead units, but it appeared
that he had not even tried to document the battle
at the sharp end. Aitken was furious that Bovill
had failed him, and all Canadians, writing that
the footage was “absolutely worthless.”29 But
Bovill survived as a cameraman, continuing to
shoot footage of Canadian and British troops,
even though he consistently produced poor work.
That he was used as a cameraman throughout
the war spoke more to the lack of experienced
cinematographers than to Aitken’s generosity.30

The art of filming was still relatively new
and there had been few indigenous Canadian
companies engaged in the work. Lord
Beaverbrook, as Sir Max Aitken was known
after receiving his peerage at the end of 1916,
turned to the larger BEF and, attesting to his
influence, was able to secure a number of British
cameramen. Bovill was placed in a secondary
role and J.A.B. MacDowell, considered one of the
best cameramen of the war, took over the role of
documenting the Canadians in 1917. Geoffrey
Malins, Walter Buckstone, and Frank Bassill also
travelled the front looking for suitable Canadian
shots to meet the film mandate.
Officers generally cooperated with the
cameramen, and most liked the idea of appearing
on film. One artilleryman recounted in his diary
towards the end of the war: “Some excitement
was caused when a Canadian moving picture
outfit came and took movies of ‘A’ gun in action….
They had us all dressed up with the hats and
gas respirators on, things we didn’t ordinarily
wear while on gun duty, although we kept them
handy.”31 Posing was not uncommon for both
still and moving film, with most soldiers and
few cameramen worrying about questions of
authenticity. Yet not all soldiers agreed with this
publicity campaign. Lieutenant-Colonel Agar
Adamson of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry wrote disdainfully to his wife of Talbot
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Papineau, one of his former officers, who was
then working for the CWRO:
Papineau turned up two days ago with a
cinematographic camera and wanted us to pose
for him. I suggested he take photographs of the
graves of the fallen and ordered him out of the
line as I did not think it fitting in the present
critical situation that officers should be going
about with a Punch and Judy Show.…My views
are not shared by many Commanding Officers,
who are only too anxious to advertise themselves
and rehearse all kinds of stunts when they
heard they were coming, such as reading maps,
giving orders, pretending to be shot and carried
off on stretchers. I only hope the camera gets
smashed.32

The dour Adamson was definitely in the
minority and much of the surviving war film
consists of smiling soldiers, often waving for the
camera. Yet powerful and poignant film was shot,
and often when soldiers did not realize they were
in the camera’s lens.
But cooperation did not ease the ongoing
problem of securing combat footage: cameramen
were just as likely to take a bullet in the head
as an infantryman who looked above a trench
parapet. With battles going in at night, at dawn
and, by 1917, behind massive creeping barrages
of high explosives and shrapnel, sometimes there
was nothing to see but dust and debris. A number
of minor Canadian operations in the summer
of 1917 were filmed but produced little useable
footage.33
L. McLeod Gould of the 102nd Battalion
described the difficulty of the photographers and
cameramen in capturing the war on film. While
the 102nd planned to attack a series of German
trenches known as the Triangle, east of Vimy
Ridge in the summer of 1917, Gould noted,
For the benefit of many who believe that the
moving-pictures taken under the auspices of
the Canadian [War] Records Office are ‘faked’
it may here be related that during this tour the
official photographer appeared at Battalion
Headquarters one evening an hour before a
double offensive was due. He had been sent up
in view of the importance of these operations and
requested to be forward up the line….When the
action started the shelling was so terrific on both
sides that it was impossible to see ten yards in
any direction, dry mud was being blown from
two to three hundred feet in the air, and this, with
the smoke, made everything as dark as night.34

The photographer returned to Battalion
command headquarters without any shots, but
he had been in the front lines. Other experienced
cameramen like Geoffrey Mallins tried to film the
Canadians in battle, but much of his footage was
considered a “complete failure” by the CWRO and
Lord Beaverbrook.35
After several months of shooting, J.A.B.
MacDowell was getting desperate, and began
to expose himself dangerously during the 1917
Passchendaele offensive. But with bullets and
shrapnel raining down around him, he was
forced to admit again that since the attacks
went in under darkness, there was little hope of
capturing the experience of battle on film. It got
no easier in the last year of the war, and the series
of Allied hammer blows against the crumbling
German armies in the campaigns that made up
the Hundred Days (August to November 1918)
were equally difficult to shoot. But the footage
for this period was far stronger, with images of
advancing soldiers, tanks, artillery, and aircraft.
Yet still the fighting eluded the cameramen who
remained constrained by their cumbersome and
unwieldy equipment, and the nature of combat.
Most of the film footage was shot behind the lines,
away from danger.
Beaverbrook and the CWRO were forced
to settle for these shots to fulfil the publicity
and record-keeping functions. In the summer
of 1918, moreover, Beaverbrook ordered a
full-length Canadian film to be produced. The
Battle of Courcelette (1918) was shot by W.R.
Boothe, directed by Smith, and distributed by
the CWRO in Britain and, ultimately, to Canadian
theatres. Recreations were mixed with real film
footage; maps and diagrams of the Canadian
divisional advances were juxtaposed to create
the image of “victory succeed[ing] victory.”36 It
was a resounding success. The equally popular,
The Taking of Vimy Ridge (1919), was shown
across Canada the next year.37
Lord Beaverbrook’s films were acknowledged
as a propaganda coup.38 By the end of the war,
there were two full-length Canadian films, nine
shorts and thousands of feet of additional
footage that had been supplied to the British
cinematography committee to be used in imperial
productions. When the profits were tallied, a
£10,000 cheque was awarded to the Canadian
government, which was double that received by
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*****

A

s the citizen-soldiers were being repatriated
home in early 1919, one Canadian
commentator acknowledged that it was
Beaverbrook’s foresight and hard work that
had provided “a national record of inestimable
historical value.”40 Indeed, Beaverbrook’s war
art, photographs, and film form the core of the
war’s visual language. But just as there were
plans for a war museum to house the impressive
war art collection and an official historian to
codify the war in print, Beaverbrook had hoped
that there would also be an official war
film so that Canadians could “see what
their brothers, husbands, and sons did
during the Great War.”41 However, it would
be almost two decades before Canadians
would again see the footage.

of the CWRO film surfaced at a local theatre,
Duguid organized a nationwide search to locate
additional film. A number of British films, like
the Battle of Arras (1917), were found and added
to the collection, but not the important Canadian
footage.
The Legion was alerted to the situation and
posted advertisements to its members, but very
soon it, and other wartime patriotic institutions,
like the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire,
were pressuring Duguid to allow the existing film
to be shown at various branches or reunions.
Duguid demurred, writing to J.H. MacBrien, chief
of the general staff, that these valuable archival
records had to be preserved and restored before
anyone could use them. The Legion continued
to appeal to the AHS: with a war museum and
the multi-volume official history delayed, the
former until 1942, the latter never completed, an
official film, argued veterans, would help to stir
old memories and provide a proper memorial
to their deeds and that of their fallen comrades.

Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 167233

the Australians and New Zealanders because
Beaverbrook’s men had shot and contributed
more footage.39 Beaverbrook’s patronage had
been responsible primarily for this success:
his quest to make the Canadian actions of the
war known widely had paid both financial and
publicity dividends at little cost to Canadians,
while leaving a legacy of historical film for future
generations.

When Beaverbrook’s British
cinematography committee was closed
and the film rights sold for a profit in
1919, those films relating to Canada
were sent back to the Army Historical
Section (AHS) in Ottawa. But there were
no cinematographical experts on staff
at the AHS and the cans of film were
deposited in the archives to gather dust
alongside the textual records. No one even
inspected them. When they were finally
examined by the official historian, Colonel
A.F. Duguid, three years later, he found to
his surprise that most of the films were
positives and scratched beyond repair.
No copies could be made from them in
their pitiful condition, and the film was
already beginning to break down under the
fluctuating heat and humidity within the
archives.42 As well, many films appeared
to be missing. That same year, after some
Colonel A.F. Duguid, official historian. Duguid
believed passionately in memorializing the
Canadian war effort, but had no experience
with film.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2005

11
7

Canadian Military History, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 3, Art. 2

Arthur Doughty, Dominion Archivist. During the war,
Doughty had gone overseas to collect war trophies;
afterwards, he distributed many of them throughout
the country as symbols of Canada’s war effort. He
was a driving force in presenting Lest We Forget to
Canadians.

$350,000. Furthermore, a confusing and, in
parts, racy story that attempted to portray
both the comedy and tragedy of war – and
failed at both, when combined with the
misfortune of being released just when
the first “talkies” were hitting the screen,
resulted in an expensive fiasco.45 It nearly
destroyed the emerging Canadian film
industry and put paid to an official war film.

In 1926, to avoid increasing demands, Duguid
transferred the archival film collection of 144
separate reels, more than 30,000 feet of footage,
to the Dominion Archivist, Arthur Doughty, for
“preservation and safe-keeping.”43
But Canadians continued to show an
interest in the Great War, even if they preferred
romanticized novels to the war poetry and fiction
that questioned the futility of the trenches. The
cartoons of Bruce Bairnsfather and his lovable
‘Ol’ Bill,’ the “everyman” who represented the
“poor bloody infantry,” remained far more
popular than the poetry of Wilfrid Owen or
Siegfried Sassoon.44 Attesting to Bairnsfather’s
enduring appeal, and with successful London and
Broadway plays under his belt, he was enticed
to make a major Canadian-produced film, Carry
on Sergeant! (1928).
Despite Bairnsfather’s international success,
a cartoonist does not make a director. Cost
overruns drove up the budget to an incredible

However, in the aftermath of Carry on
Sergeant!, the Department of National
Defence contacted Doughty in April 1929
to enquire about the “priceless historical”
film records, and what could be done about
them. Doughty, Duguid, and F.C. Badgley
from the Government Motion Picture
Bureau (GMPB), the precursor organization
to the National Film Board, organized a
committee to study the film issue. They
determined that conservation had to be
carried out immediately since the films
were “worse than anyone thought.” Many
of the original films had also been cut up
and their provenance destroyed by editing
different parts together. More problematic
were the significant gaps in the film collection,
which former CWRO members confirmed after
seeing the existing footage.46 Conservation was
begun but important footage remained lost.
The dark years of the Depression were
painful for most Canadians and, as R.B.
Bennett’s government struggled to deal with the
unprecedented economic collapse, plans for an
official war film were again side-lined. Even the
Legion was preoccupied with petitioning support
for suffering veterans. But there was a turn of fate
in early 1933 as George Drew, an artillery veteran
and politician, was rummaging through basement
vaults at the Ontario Motion Picture Bureau. He
came across tins of celluloid and they were shown
at his brigade’s reunion dinner that night. With
the gunners reliving old memories as the black
and white images flickered across the screen, the
chief of the general staff, A.G.L. McNaughton, also
a Great War gunner, remarked: “I’ll be swizzled….
Those are the ruddy things we’ve been looking

12
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for.”47 Drew had uncovered 25,000 feet of lost
Canadian footage. The newspapers reported
widely that the “long lost war films” had been
uncovered, and there was a renewed push to have
these “authentic pictures of warfare” shown to all
Canadians. The official footage, newspaper men
intoned, would counter the untruthful scenes
presented “from the screen of Hollywood and
elsewhere.”48
Bennett responded to this pressure from
veterans, politicians, the media, and even the
Governor General, by forming another committee
shortly after the gunner’s dinner. Doughty,
McNaughton, Duguid, and Badgely examined tens
of thousands of feet of film for a possible official
production. Yet as the committee carried out their
work, Bennett’s Cabinet worried that a war film
might spark unwanted passions among citizens
suffering through the Depression. Moreover,
the peace movement of the 1920s, which had
rallied around the mantra of the “war to end all
wars,” would not stand for any glorification of the
conflict. Bennett and his Cabinet felt an official
war film could be a combustible spark that
might set the country’s veterans against the peace
movement. But the veterans could not be ignored,
especially since they had powerful influence in
the House of Commons and the Cabinet.
Doughty’s committee examined 60,863
feet of footage in order to select about 9,000
feet (two hours) for a film. Captain William
Douglas, a CWRO veteran and employee with
the GMPB, selected film clips from 685 films of
varying lengths, while W.W. Murray, another CEF
veteran, wrote the script. A musical score was
commissioned. Douglas reported that there were
powerful and evocative shots, but no footage that
showed any front line fighting. In telling Canada’s
Great War history, the official film would be
constrained by what Beaverbrook’s cameramen
had shot during the war.
It was equally difficult to craft the film’s
message. By the 1930s, the memory of the
Great War had become far more contested with
the release of antiwar books, of which Erich
Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front
(1930) remained the best known. The Academy
award-winning film of the same name also
stimulated a new approach to tackling the Great
War on film, and especially the suffering of the
common soldier.49 But much of the CWRO’s

footage had focused on battles, generals and
politicians, and there were no interviews and
few highlights of individual soldiers. How would
Canadians accept this lack of coverage?
There was the possibility of filming new
scenes, but this was condemned by the committee
since it would detract from the authenticity of the
original records. To hold the title, official, the film
would have to be based on real footage. Most of it
was, although there was some realistic wartime
recreated segments, like the assassination
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. However, this
footage was indicated at the start of the film as a
“faithful reproduction according to the historical
record.”50 To help augment the film, moreover,
the committee was able to draw upon British,
French, and German footage, some of which was
in the Canadian collection. The committee also
aimed to place the Canadian war effort within
the larger Allied campaigns, and there was a
conscious attempt to avoid the “impression that
Canada won the war.”51 McNaughton ordered
that the film avoid the “’heroes’ sort of thing or
sob stuff,” but it also had to have, Badgely noted,
a “theatrical punch or it won’t go over” with the
public.52 The film was cut and edited; the script
written and rewritten.
Yet still Bennett’s Cabinet worried about
how the film would be received, and while
Donald Sutherland, the minister of national
defence, pushed hard for the film’s authorization,
assuring the prime minister that there would
be no “glorification of war,” and that it was
the government’s duty to show these “valuable
records” lest they be “lost to posterity,” many
other ministers feared the war and its contested
memory. It had been too divisive and painful,
and none wanted to remind Canadians that
it had been Conservatives who had enacted
conscription.53
The authorization to release the film was a
near run thing and the Cabinet was still against
it even after a private showing. But veterans in
Bennett’s government rallied behind the cause.
McNaughton even went so far as to warn the
prime minister that “we may expect a great
volume of serious criticism” if the film is further
delayed.54 Some of the contentious images were
struck from the film, like dismembered bodies,
as well as the question of “fixing the blame for
the outbreak of the war directly on Germany.”55
13
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Additional last minute changes included adding
more material relating to the patriotic war work
on the home front, especially the role of women.56
A final letter by Doughty to the Cabinet won
the case: “The picture…depicts scenes of selfsacrifice and heroism, of devoted sacrifice and
of patriotic effort, and will lay before those who
see it a heritage of tradition of self forgetfulness
and of loyalty which has been wrought into the
fabric of the life of Canada. It portrays the stark
reality of War, its futility and its terrors, so that
this method of settling disputes between nations
may be dreaded and avoided.”57 After months
of debate, the Cabinet finally acted decisively:
it transferred responsibility for the film to the
Legion. The official war film would be released
to Canadians in March 1935, under the title of
Lest We Forget.
*****

D

e s p i t e
t h e
C a b i n e t ’ s
caution and delay in authorizing Lest We
Forget, it is perhaps not surprising that most
of its members were in attendance for the film’s
opening night at the Princess Theatre in Ottawa
on 7 March 1935. The Legion was hosting the
event, but dignitaries like the Governor General,
Bennett, and senators joined veterans. “The Gala
Performance promises
to be the outstanding
social event of the Ottawa
season,” predicted one
newspaper.58 Attesting
to the pageantry of the
evening, veterans were
given permission to
wear their uniforms at
the performance.
Brigadier-General
Alex Ross, Dominion
president of the Legion,
opened the ceremonies
by reminding the
packed crowd that the
picture opening was
not a “social event,” as
some of the newspapers
had made it out to be,
but rather a “solemn
occasion, long desired
by the veteran body
of Canada, which has

felt it necessary that war be portrayed in all its
stark reality.” And that stark reality could be
shown because there was a “complete historical
narrative of the war compiled from the archives
of allied and enemy nations, as well as from our
records, so that those who see may understand
its genesis, its progression, and its terrible
aftermath.” The official film would contrast
favourably, he claimed, with Hollywood fictional
accounts. He was followed by Captain Ben Allen,
president of the Ottawa Legion Branch, who
extended a welcome to all the distinguished
guests and led the audience in three wartime
songs: It’s a Long Way to Tipperary, Pack Up
Your Troubles in Your Old Kit Bag, and There’s a
Long, Long Trail A-Winding.59 As the crowd sang
or hummed half forgotten, maudlin songs, this
act of personal and public commemoration drew
on the nostalgic past to help frame the coming
film.
Lest We Forget covered the whole war, placing
Canadian events within the larger international
context. Unique naval images of the sinking of
the German battleship Blucher led to the land
war, and years of trench warfare. The striking
shots that Bovill had captured on the Somme
were a highpoint of the film, but so too were
the powerful images from the Hundred Days.
But many viewers must
have been disappointed
with the weak footage
of Vimy, a symbol of
Canada’s success and
sacrifice during the
war. Graphics helped
to convey the nature
of battles that had not
been captured on film.
“There was another
feeling mingled with
the sense of drama,
for here were real men
being maimed and
killed, real bodies lay
amidst the mud and
ruins,” recounted one
of the lucky newspaper
men allowed into the
t h e a t r e . 60 E q u a l l y
interesting was the
reaction of the crowd
that broke into applause
when well-known
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personalities,
both military and
political, appeared
on the screen, like
Sir Robert Borden,
Sir Arthur Currie,
Sir Sam Hughes,
Lord Kitchener, or
Woodrow Wilson.
Here were leaders,
almost all dead now,
who still inspired a
sense of patriotism.
The antiwar spirit of
the late 1920s was
not present on this
night of ceremony
and pomp.

the army or turn to
anti-establishment
organizations. It
was clear, however,
that footage shot
by the CWRO’s
cameramen had
been made initially
for publicity and
historical record
purposes, but now
the viewers were
ascribing to it their
own values, fears,
and worries.

“Patrons of
the Canadian dead
soldiers have a
The film ended
special opportunity,
with the ominous
in comfortable
phrase from the
seats, to see the
narrator: “Was it a
glamour of the
war to end war, did
human slaughter
-house,” was the
it attain its desired
scathing review
end – or did it not?”
by the Ottawa
With the rise of Adolf
Citizen.61 The dead
Hitler in Germany,
deserved better:
Benito Mussolini in
Still images of soldiers leaving a trench captured from the film
they should, it
Italy, and Japanese
Lest We Forget.
would appear, be
aggression in the
commemorated in
Far East, more than
sombre and reverential tones. Another reviewer
a few film-goers must have been troubled as
suggested that the film was an “effort to portray
they left the theatre. Had the war accomplished
the tragic futility of war and to bring home
anything? For the British Empire, the question
through the visible sense the stupidity and folly
could only be, yes. Germany had been stopped,
of armed conflict.” That had not been the goal of
aggression punished, the Kaiser’s quest for
the film-makers, but the same reviewer also noted
greater power blocked. But the real question was
that as the “real pictures, taken in many cases in
if the war was worth the cost, and could a film
the height of battle, were thrown on the screen,
address those complex issues?
veterans of various ranks actually saw themselves
This night of relived memories became the
once more ‘going over the top’ or advancing over
focus for an intense debate in the media, in
‘No Man’s Land’ to their objective.” This was
Parliament, and among veterans. Lest We Forget
a chance to see the “privates and non-coms”
was discussed, critiqued, and celebrated over
who had “won the war.” Thus, not only did the
the coming months as it was shown across the
Ottawa Journal categorize Lest We Forget as an
country. There was no meta narrative, no uniform
“anti-war” film, but also one where the forgotten
discourse: some newspapers and letter-writers
“poor bloody infantry” finally had a chance to
saw it as the glorification of war while others
be recognised for their bravery and devotion to
found it coloured distastefully by an antiwar
duty.62
fervour; some argued that all citizens of the
Yet some Canadians res-ponded angrily to
country should see the film, others thought it too
these negative reviews. A.U.G. Berry, a Member
horrific for children, and much too dangerous for
of Parliament, felt the reviews were an insult to
the vast unemployed men who might either join
15
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the dead, “whose
to martial solutions
deeds and death it
during these
com-memorates.”63
difficult Depression
years. Former Prime
Stung by the
Minister Arthur
attack, the Ottawa
Meighen took on
Citizen’s editorial
both Murdock
board responded
and Woodsworth,
that it was not
thundering in one
the film to which
speech that being a
they had objected,
pacifist is fine, “but
but the pageantry
we do not find him
surrounding the
in the danger zones
event, especially
where the world’s
since “millions were
troubles are being
on the dole” and
brewed, where
suffering despite the
treaties are being
many “sacrifices [of]
torn in the tatters
Canadian soldiers.”
and thrown to the
Using the film and
winds of heaven.”
its docu-mentation
Lest We Forget was
of sacrifice as
based on official
a spring-board,
footage shot during
critics attacked the
the war and would
Bennett government
help, he opined,
for failing to live
steel the youth of
up to the legacy
today for future
of the Great War
conflict. Despite not
soldiers. The grim
having seen the film,
circumstance of
Meighen believed it
Canadian society in
Images of soldiers working in a trench captured from the film
was “propaganda
1935, where both
Lest We Forget.
for peace.” But if
war and capitalism
“war has to come,”
were
being
Canadians “are prepared to do their duty.”65
questioned, was influencing some reviewers,
Lest We Forget was inciting passions to fight for
and presumably audiences.
peace, prepare for war, and perhaps galvanize the
The debate engendered by the film moved
unemployed masses against the failed capitalist
from the media to the House of Commons and
system.
into the Senate chambers. After seeing the movie,
That same year, the Canadian Military
the pacifist and leader of the Progressives, J.S.
Gazette drew its readers to the “very bitter
Woodsworth, questioned the yearly allotment of
controversy” over the film, but also felt that Lest
money to the Department of National Defence,
We Forget neither promoted nor was against war,
and thought the funds could be used, as Lest We
but simply “a complete historical narrative of the
Forget had reminded all viewers, he suggested,
war, compiled from the archives.” The footage
to find new steps for “world peace.”64 Senator
Jas Murdock evoked the film to address similar
“cannot but excite admiration for the devotion of
questions, and although he believed it provided
the cameramen who took many of the pictures
one of the “finest historical records” of the war,
in the thick of bitter engagements, periling their
he worried that the scenes of brutality and
lives with the same abandon as did the actual
patriotism might promote dangerous passions
fighting.” The memory of war would resist the
in its viewers. Every Canadian over the age of
ravages of time, especially since film “taken on
thirty should see the film, he thought, but it
the spot cannot lie.”66 Despite the naiveté of
would be a “crime against humanity” to show it
assuming the impartiality of film, the Gazette
to “impressionable youth” who might be driven
hoped it would not be employed to support
16
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polemic causes, but rather would simply stand
as a record of the war.
As Lest We Forget was shown across the
country, advertisements were equally ambivalent
about the film’s message. In Toronto, the
billboards shouted: “THE TRUTH AT LAST
from the OFFICIAL war films.” “Truth” and
“official” could not help but be observed.67 With
advertisements claiming, “War as it really was!,”
it seemed as if the war experience had been
captured and displayed for all Canadians.68 Yet
as a record of combat, it could only present
part of that experience. It might not lie, but
it certainly did not tell the whole truth. Film
imposed structure on a chaotic situation: it
brought order to the inherently disordered.
Generals seemed to have control over their
plans; soldiers were smiling and anxious
for battle. Although there were powerful and
disturbing images of advancing soldiers, tanks,
and corpses, film could not convey the smell of
rotting flesh, the constant fatigue that plagued all
men, the discomfort of living in open ditches, the
cacophony of brutal sounds, or the waves of fear
emanating from young boys about to go “over the
top.” After viewing the films, many must have felt
that they now understood the experience of war;
unfortunately, it was, for the most part, much
worse than they could ever have imagined.69

Another commentator, future diplomat Escott
Reid, writing in Saturday Night, queried the very
nature of the film: “What is it that they wanted
to persuade us not to forget?” The film rightly
highlighted the bravery of the soldiers, Reid
noted, but it “did little to make us remember
the stupidity of the generals who planned the
Passchendaele offensive and other equally
murderous mistakes or what the troops felt about
the stupidity of the generals.” As Reid remarked
acidly: “a film sponsored by the Department of
National Defence of Canada naturally prefers as
its unavowed title ‘Let us Forget the Stupidity of
Generals.’”71
Despite the bitter controversy, Lest We Forget
played for over a year in Canadian theatres,
grossing more than $34,000. 72 It was not a
blockbuster, but since it had been produced for
almost nothing, these were significant profits. The
film also had a successful international run, and
Beaverbrook’s footage again helped to represent
Canadians throughout the British Empire.73

But the true legacy of the film remains its
contested interpretation. Lest We Forget propelled
constituents to reach far beyond a simple narrative
and to question the meaning of the war. These
reactions cannot be separated from the year
of its showing in 1935, with domestic anguish
over the Depression and
In one of the most virulent
the internationally inspired
denouncements of the film,
fear of another world-wide
Margaret Curry, a former
conflict between forces of
wartime nurse, questioned
Fascism, Communism, and
Democracy. Clearly, too,
how any could call this film
the impact of the film was
an actual representation of
the war:
partially due to its official,
seemingly authentic nature.
Did it bring to their nostrils
But Beaverbrook had aimed
the stench of gangrene,
to both document the war
the sight of the poor head
and publicize the Canadian
Still
image
of
dead
soldiers
captured
from
the
wounds plucking out their
war effort. His film footage
film Lest We Forget.
brains with their fingers;
was shot for a purpose;
the pitiful wrecks of shellshocks, the death of the tetanus patients?...
yet two decades later a far different film was
If this wonderful film really showed the ‘stark
presented. While there are no answers to the
realities of war’ it should show the death of
multiple meanings interwoven or underpinning
gassed patients….They were terrible deaths to
Lest We Forget, and how it was interpreted by
behold. Did any…ever see...death by gas...his
Canadians across the country, one is tempted
protruding eyes and the blood streaming from
them, his lolling tongue, his bleeding ears, his
to agree with a contemporary reviewer who
terrible rasping gasps, his clutching hands to his
declared that it was “the most important film of
throat - ah, they will want the curtain drawn.70
the decade.”74
*****
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L

est We Forget is tame to modern eyes,
especially in the aftermath of the hyperrealism of Stephen Spielberg’s Saving Private
Ryan (1998) or other modern war films. But Lest
We Forget has much to tell us of the Great War.
The war’s memory had become contested ground
by 1935, especially when viewed after the waves
of antiwar literature of the 1920s. And while these
protest works were not accepted by all, and were,
for the most part, an aspect of elite discourse,
the fame and international support of the film, All
Quiet on the Western Front, reached many more
Canadians. The war could not be portrayed in the
same terms as Beaverbrook might have hoped in
its immediate aftermath, but nor could it be an
antiwar film since the memory of the war was not
one of utter hopelessness and suicidal attacks.
The fighting had been terrible, but it had been,
in the minds of most Canadians, fought for a just
cause: to stop German aggression and to support
the British Empire, and the important values
for which it stood. These were messages woven
into the film and juxtaposed against the terrible
cost of the war. In the mid-1930s, though, it was
inevitable that the film would question whether
the terrible bloodletting had been worth the
cost, especially with the rise of dictators around
the world. Some used the film as a warning to
the future: both to rearm or prepare for peace.
Neither message was part of the film’s narrative,
but resonated with many viewers.
The film-makers had aimed to offer an authentic
glimpse into Canada’s part in the war. Yet just
as no history can fully capture the past, neither
can a poem, a play, or a film. While participants
could use their memories to craft postwar works,
without Lord Beaverbrook’s foresight, there
would have been almost no moving picture legacy
of Canada’s part in the war. To both understand
Lest We Forget, and the history behind this
important record, it is worth remembering that
war footage consists of not only what the soldiers
did, but what the cameramen could shoot.
This existing wartime footage, which is
used and reused in every History Television
documentary or National Film Board production,
is all we shall ever have in representing the
moving picture legacy of Canadians in the Great
War.75 Beaverbrook’s desire to publicize and
document Canada’s Great War sacrifice ensured

that aspects of that experience were captured on
film. But it was selective, and the result must be
necessarily that the war will be reinterpreted by
each succeeding generation. However, with the
CWRO film footage, we have a better opportunity
to do just that, and build upon Beaverbrook’s
bedrock of history.
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